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A born-again global firm: Inés Rosales SAU in the traditional sector  
of pastry production 
Dale mis encomiendas, aunque no lo conozco, y dile que me pesa mucho y parte con él de aquesa 
conserva, que para ti, bien mío, la tenía guardada. Mañana es día de amasijo y te haré una torta de 
aceite con que sin vergüenza puedas convidar a tus camaradas. 
Give him my regards, though I do not know him, and tell him that I am sorry, and share with him  
these pickles that I had treasured for you, my dear. Tomorrow is baking day and I will make you  
an olive oil torta so you may treat your comrades proudly.  
Mateo Alemán, Guzmán de Alfarache, Cátedra, 1987, p. 486. 
 
1. Introduction 
Family firms, in general, and, more specifically, their internationalisation 
processes have lately received increasing attention from researchers. The international 
literature generated over the last years is ample and has been recently reviewed by 
Puckall and Calabro (2014). Spanish literature on the subject includes monographs 
published by the magazines Información Comercial Española (2009), Revista de la 
Historia de la Economía y la Empresa (2014) and Journal of Evolutionary Studies in 
Business (2016), as well as research works on the internationalisation of large 
companies, both family firms and corporations (Fernández Pérez and Lluch, 2016).1 
This article studies, from the born again global firm framework, the firm Inés 
Rosales. The company has the advantage of belonging to a traditional industrial sector 
                                                 
1 Corporations in Calvo (2008 and 2014), Caruana (2009), Caruana and García Ruiz (2009), Vidal (2008a 
and 2008b), Del Ángel (2012), Arroyo et al. (2012), Martín Aceña (2007), Pérez Hernández (2009), 
Torres (2009a and 2009b), and Virós (2009). Family firms in Puig and Fernández (2008, 2009a and 
2009b), Moreno (2009), Fernández Moya (2010, 2013a, 2013b and 2015), Colli et al. (2012), and 
Lindoso et al. (2014). Small and medium-sized firms in Guillén (2004 and 2005) and Álvaro Moya 
(2009). Spanish cooperatives in Guillén (2005). Internationalisation processes prior to 1959 in Martínez 
Rus (2008), Fernández Moya (2009a, 2009b and 2012), Goñi (2008, 2009a and 2009b), San Román 
(2009), and Fernández-Roca (2014).  
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(pastry) that is far from the most frequently analysed high technology industries.2 After 
a huge crisis and a change of hands, the company grew in the national market and, then, 
leaded its resources to the international market but far from reaching an improved size.  
The postulates of Oviatt and McDougall’s (1994) focused on rapid insertion 
processes, about international new ventures, takes born-global firms as its object of 
study. These are originally small and medium-sized companies (with less than 500 
employees and annual sales of less than 100 million dollars)3 whose executive boards 
see the world as their market from the start; in which cutting-edge technology is basic 
for the development of innovative products or relatively unique processes; which are 
present in at least five countries, having been internationalised within an average three-
year period from their establishment; and which generate at least 25 percent of their 
sales in foreign markets.4 In addition, the sale of their products, the majority of which 
are intended for industrial uses, typically involves substantial value adding (Knight and 
Cavusgil, 2004; Knight, Madsen and Servais, 2004; Kontinen and Ojala, 2012; 
Andersson et al., 2013).  
This theoretical setting challenges all traditional internationalisation theories, 
because it focuses on early internationalisation, when the whole world is seen as a 
potential market, and describes the company’s simultaneous presence in various 
physically and culturally distant countries without the need to go through any 
incremental stages. In fact, these firms apply multiple formulas of international 
relations, which are simultaneously compatible with each other and encompass from the 
                                                 
2 There are only a few examples of internationalised companies manufacturing traditional products, like 
Haitoglou, the Greek halva producer, which follows the pattern described by the school of Uppsala 
(Plakoyiannaki and Deligianni, 2009). However, the number of companies applying the born-global firm 
scheme is even smaller. The olive oil producer Hijos de Ybarra is one of the few exceptions (Fernández-
Roca, 2014), as is also the case of Pioneer Wines (Graves and Thomas, 2008). 
3 Knight and Cavusgil, 1996. 
4 A review of the different theoretical propositions can be found in Kuvalainen et al. (2012) and, with 
further detail, in Gabrielsson and Kirpalani (2012). Leonidou and Samiee (2012) offer a critical vision 
according to which these are companies that are simply internationalised very quickly.  
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companies’ own marketing channels, through alliances with large distributors or 
retailers, commercial agents, individual distributors or even franchisees, to establishing 
subsidiary firms in highly consolidated markets (Solberg, 2012; Schueffel et al., 2014).5 
These enterprises enjoy sales-associated scale economies in various markets at the same 
time, something that allows them to increase their sales and reduce their costs per unit. 
In addition, thanks to the new information technologies, the firms’ executive boards 
have direct access to clients around the world and receive information at high speed. 
Finally, these companies are ambitious and audacious in their internationalisation 
decisions and show no risk aversion (Knight, Madsen and Servais, 2004; Leonidou and 
Samiee, 2012). 
The concept of born-again global firms –or re-born global firms, as defined by 
Schueffel et al. (2014) – emerged from the born global firm idea (Bell et al., 2001, 2003, 
2004; Olejnik and Swoboda, 2012). These were firms already solidly established in their 
domestic markets but had not been really motivated or interested in expanding their 
activities to foreign markets, until they suddenly decide to implement a rapid 
internationalisation strategy (two to five years from their first international operation). 
This strategy is often the result of a “critical incident” or, in most cases, of a 
combination of “critical incidents” usually involving a change in ownership and/or 
management, but also mergers or acquisitions. In consequence, the companies usually 
end up internationalising 25 percent of their sales (Kuvalainen et al, 2012; Kalinic and 
                                                 
5 Among business internationalization theoretical frameworks, the Uppsala gradualist model (Johanson 
and Wiedershein, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 1980) is the one most frequently used. This model 
considers the internationalization process as a series of incremental phases and has recently integrated 
networks and internationalization opportunities as factors, given that firms are more interested in the 
liability of outsidership than in the liability of foreignness (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). A second model 
is found in the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1993, 1997, 1998; Casson, 1997, 2000), which combines 
basic transaction cost analysis with the incorporation of institutional elements, and has also been updated 
to include strategic alliances and network relationships as elements favoring the internationalization 
process (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The Linkage-Leverage-Learning model (Mathews, 2002a, 2002b; 
2006) is a third option that can be applied to family small and medium-sized businesses in peripheral 
countries, especially to the so-called “dragon multinationals” (Della Costa, 2014). 
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Forza, 2012; Nummela et al., 2014).6 More specifically, Graves and Thomas (2008) 
defined the three aspects determining the internationalisation process: (i) the extent to 
which the owning family is committed to the process and the new strategy, (ii) the 
amount of financial resources available for the internationalisation and the actual will to 
invest them on it, and (iii) the ability to develop or acquire the organisational capacities 
required for the process. 
More recently, Dimitratos et al. (2010) identified another category, the global 
smaller firms, characterised by a certain type of entrepreneurial orientation, which 
includes a specific attitude towards risk, innovation and competitive aggressiveness, so 
that promptness in internationalisation is not the only relevant dimension.7 
The present research integrates the usual internationalisation channels in the 
study of small and medium-sized firms. Three options are thus considered: (i) that of 
traditional small and medium-sized companies, which are gradually internationalised 
and establish themselves in nearby markets with the main objective of surviving and 
growing; (ii) that of born-again global firms, which are initially focused on their 
domestic markets and then suddenly internationalised as a result of critical events like 
changes in ownership or management; and (iii) that of born-global firms, which are 
rapidly internationalised soon after their creation, so that they are simultaneously 
present –independently of the distance from the firm’s headquarters– in various foreign 
markets, where their products, developed according to the foreign demand, sell 
especially well.8 Into this general setting, Kontinen and Ojala (2012) introduce several 
dimensions in order to qualify the various strategies used by companies for their 
                                                 
6 The literature offers comparative analyses of the definitions of born-global firms (Gabrielsson and 
Kirpalani, 2012: 5) and of these definitions with those of born-again global firms (Olejnik and Swoboda, 
2012: 487, and Olejnik, 2014: 28). A comparative exercise on the different types of companies is found in 
Sheppard and McNaughton (2014), who conclude that, on average, born-again global firms are larger and 
older and less prone to invest in R&D than born-global firms are. 
7 On the other hand, López et al. (2008) established the differences between born-regional and born-
global firms. 
8 A figure included in Graves and Thomas (2008: 153) didactically compares these three options. 
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internationalisation, which include (i) time, referring to the speed and pace of the 
process, (ii) scale, considered in relation to foreign sales, and (iii) scope, meaning the 
number of countries in which the firm operates (Kuvalainen et al., 2012).9   
For the purposes of this article, case study methodology is especially interesting 
because it allows gaining deeper knowledge of the phenomena under analysis, and has 
emerged as a relevant methodological approach for qualitative researchers.10 The 
present research can in fact be defined as a “positivist case study” (Leppäaho et al., 
2015: 1-2).11 Case studies are used in scholarly research for the purposes of empirical 
description and classification, theory building and testing, clinical diagnosis, 
professional preparation, and programme evaluation (Flyvbjerg 2006; Hamel 1993; Yin 
2003). In a widely cited article, Eisenhardt (1989) proposed them as an ideal 
methodology for exploring an empirical phenomenon and building theory based on the 
evidence collected (Guillén and García-Canal, 2010). 
The article is structured in six sections. After this opening section, the second 
paragraph focuses on the presentation and criticism of the research sources. A born-
again global like Inés Rosales has a prior history of expansion across its national market 
that excludes any attempt at internationalisation, a history that is summarised in the 
third section of this work. The fourth section describes how Inés Rosales emerged as a 
born-again global firm after the disruptive events that led to the access of a new family 
(Moreno) to its ownership and management, shortly after the previous shock of its near 
dissolution. The reborn Inés Rosales inherited the artisanal manufacturing tradition of 
                                                 
9 “The academic body of literature on reborn or born-again globals is small” (Schueffel et al., 2014: 422). 
Sheppard and McNaughton (2014: 46) insist on the same idea: “There are few empirical descriptions of 
born-again global firms and few investigations of how they may differ from their more studied born-
global counterparts”. 
10 Scranton, 1992; Church; 1993; Mackie, 2001; Mahoney, 2003; Plakoyiannaki and Deligianni, 2009; 
Dimitratos et al., 2010; Wild, 2010; Leonidou and Samiee, 2012; Jones et al., 2013. 
11 As Leppäaho et al. (2015: 11) pointed out: “The case study methodology is likely to continue to play a 
significant role in the FB area. Case study is a powerful methodology that can be employed in an 
inventive and rigorous way to arrive at a more fine grained contextual understanding of FB phenomena, 
and to advance research in the field.” 
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the old firm, but has a clear international orientation that includes a strategy to enter 
several markets at the same time, a global mentality and the product flexibility required 
to sell a high percentage of its output abroad (Kontinen and Ojala, 2010; Olejnik, 
2012).12 At the end of the process here described, Inés Rosales has not only become an 
internationalised company but, since the opening of a subsidiary in 2015, also a 
multinational firm.13 Section fifth concentrates on Inés Rosales’ economic-financial 
results with the purpose of discovering the positive effects that internationalisation may 
have had on the firm. The analysis is done through an in-depth scrutiny of the actual 
results and a benchmarking, counterfactual, analysis of the results that Inés Rosales 
would have had if the internationalisation process had not taken place (Buckley and 
Fernández Pérez, 2016). 
Finally, the conclusions section confirms the relevance of the case here 
presented, given that Inés Rosales does not fit the usual pattern of knowledge-intensive 
companies as specified in the literature, it manufactures a traditional, almost artisanal, 
product like the olive oil torta (Lubinski et al., 2013: 8), and, in spite of the difference 
on size, its attitude is in line for some patterns from that of Spanish large multinationals 
in the food industry (Guillén and García Canal, 2010).14 In this sense, Inés Rosales, as 
other Spanish multinational agro-food industries, was a second-line competitor some 
                                                 
12 The article is focused on Inés Rosales as a born-again global firm, but it would also be possible to study 
it from the point of view of its combination of family enterprise and internationalisation process, from 
which an interest emerges to find out whether the family defines the internationalisation strategy or the 
strategy is imposed on it (Gallo and Sveen, 1991; Gallo and García-Pont, 1996). The family’s weight on 
the company’s decisions is maybe greater in small and medium-sized firms than it is in larger family 
businesses, although recent research works on small and medium-sized firms have questioned the idea 
that their family character hinders their expansion to foreign markets (Puig and Fernández, 2009a and 
2009b; Lubinski et al., 2013; Fernández Pérez and Lluch, 2016). In addition, studying the 
internationalisation of a family business allows applying an interdisciplinary approach that combines both 
history and management to define the company’s contribution to the exploitation of international 
entrepreneurship opportunities (Gil López et al., 2016: 183). 
13 Lubinski et al. (2013: 9) define internationalised companies and multinational companies as “firms that 
control operations in more than one country as opposed to internationally active firms that merely export 
from a single home base”, and family firms as “companies significantly influenced by a family, usually 
through ownership and/or management”. 
14 The Spanish multinationals studied by Guillén and García Canal (2010), like Freixenet, Ebro-Puleva or 
Grupo SOS, have expanded worldwide and are very different from the SME Inés Rosales, 
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years ago and now it is a global company (see Table 3, at the Annex) without the need 
of a technological basis. Inés Rosales as other agro-food companies embarked in a huge 
investment (see Figure 1) in order to gain scale improvements.15 However, and far from 
those patterns, the internationalization of Inés Rosales started at distant countries, which 
would appreciate the torta as a healthy food (see Section 4). Within an eighteen-year 
period, stretching between 1996 and 2014, Inés Rosales’ exports have reached 25 
countries, accounting for 20 percent of its sales. 
2. Sources 
The present research combines personal in-depth interviews and an examination 
of company documents and data gathered from the company’s archives and from 
commercial publications (Yin, 2003). Direct information about Inés Rosales prior to 
1985 is practically non-existent and bibliographical references are very scarce and 
extremely general.16  
Consequently, the reconstruction of the history of Inés Rosales is based on the 
information provided by the firm itself and collected during the three interviews 
conducted with Juan Moreno Tocino, the company’s current owner. The official history 
generated by the firm gives rise to difficulties already underlined by the literature 
(Rowlinson and Hassard, 1993; Rowlinson and Delahaye, 2009; Delahaye et al., 2009; 
Suddaby et al., 2010), because companies tend to construct their own thinking and their 
own myth according to later needs and justifications.17 Delahaye et al. (2009:31) point 
out that almost all companies produce historical accounts of their trajectory, either 
through formal texts making up their corporative history or through their “who we are” 
                                                 
15 Guillén and García Canal (2010). 
16 For instance, the book Sevilla, Pueblo a Pueblo (by several authors) does not include any references to 
Inés Rosales. 
17 “History is a social and rhetorical construction that can be shaped and manipulated to motivate, 
persuade, and frame action, both within and outside an organization” (Suddaby et al, 2010: 147). 
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section on their websites. 
On the other hand, the interviews with the current owner (conducted on 
September 17, 2015, May 3, 2016, and November 25, 2016) assumed the risk of 
presenting Juan Moreno’s activity as a mechanism to achieve legitimacy, status and 
reputation (Suddaby et al., 2010), a possibility that was consciously sidestepped by 
referring to the available sources, namely the company’s notarial deeds of 
incorporation, transfer to the new owners in 1985 and capital increase of Inés Rosales 
SA. The interviews combined the interviewee’s free speech with questions that had been 
previously defined in order to gather detailed information on the beginnings of Inés 
Rosales as a born-again global firm. 
Finally, the documents provided by the firm have also been used, in particular its 
internal report on the company’s internationalisation strategy and its accounting 
documentation, which included Inés Rosales’ annual accounts from 2008 to 2015, sales 
data by both country and year, and product and year, and the costs and investments 
associated with the internationalisation process. 
3. Inés Rosales Cabello and Inés Rosales: from the origin and success of a 
traditional product (the olive oil torta) to its crisis 
The history of Inés Rosales starts back in 1910, when Inés Rosales Cabello 
started the adventure of producing olive oil tortas, first at home and later on an 
industrial basis. The olive oil torta is a traditional Andalusian recipe for a homemade 
pastry elaborated with natural ingredients: unbleached wheat flour, extra-virgin olive oil 
and aromatic spices (aniseed, sesame seed and natural anise essence). The olive oil torta 
is flat and round (12 cm in diameter) and its dough combines all the above-mentioned 
ingredients. Even today, tortas are handmade and then put in the oven until they are 
cooked. The result is a crunchy cake with a salty-sweet flavour and a touch of anise. 
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Inés Rosales Cabello lived in a village called Castilleja de la Cuesta, which is 
very near the city of Seville, on the road from Seville to Huelva. She started very 
modestly, with a homemade production that women from the village sold at crossroads, 
coaching inns –later on, bus stops– and at the nearby Seville old train station. This 
ambulant sale of olive oil tortas to travellers at transit points facilitated the product’s 
expansion to other Spanish regions, and it was not long before the torta became the first 
sweetmeat commercialised far from the place where it was produced. 
The transition from homemade production to a more industrialised activity took 
place only in the 1920s, when Inés Rosales bought an oven from the village bakery and, 
a little later, invested 6,500 pesetas in new equipment.18 At the beginning of the 1930s, 
she introduced the waxed-paper wrapper that allowed optimal preservation and 
maintenance of the tortas’ properties and quality, as well as easier transportation.19 
Inés Rosales Cabello died in 1934 and her brother Esteban Rosales Cabello took 
over her responsibilities at the firm. Very soon, the breaking out of the Spanish Civil 
War paralysed the activity at the factory due to lack of raw materials. When the war 
ended, the firm announced the resumption of its activity.20 In the 1950s, Francisco 
Adorna Rosales, Inés Rosales’ only son, entered the firm. 
In the distribution of olive oil tortas across Spain, the role of Andalusian 
emigrants moving from their hometowns and villages to other Spanish regions like 
Catalonia, Madrid or the Basque Country in the 1950s and 1960s was essential.21 The 
increasing demand of tortas led to the modernisation and mechanisation of certain 
phases of the production process, incorporating new ovens and machinery, although the 
                                                 
18 During that period, the factory produced 6 million tortas a year (Cambra and Vázquez, 2010, p. 68). 
19 Inés Rosales’ website, www.inesrosales.com, visited on May 12, 2016. 
20 So that its clients could “buy at the usual selling points at the usual prices”, Seville edition of the ABC 
daily newspaper, August 1, 1939. 
21 This was also the case with Spanish and Italian olive oil exports, which were associated with the 
Spanish-Italian emigrant population in Argentina and the United States (Ramón, 2003; Fernández, 2004). 
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preparation of the torta continued to be handmade. In those years, the products were 
also diversified with the introduction of the torta de polvorón22, the almond torta23 and 
the cortadillo24.  
The 1973 economic crisis also had an impact on Inés Rosales. Sales clearly 
decreased while labour conflicts broke out in what was a labour-intensive factory, where 
the employees moved rack ovens and the kneading of the dough and the wrapping of the 
tortas were still handmade. If the seasonal character of the production is also considered 
–the tortas could not be made during winter because the wet weather spoiled the 
dough–, it is easy to understand why the company’s bad results had a negative impact 
on the social peace atmosphere in the factory.25 
In parallel to this, the olive oil torta came to be regarded as an outdated product 
and was displaced among young people and children by the booming industrial bakery 
products entering the Spanish market in those years with aggressive marketing 
campaigns targeting these segments of the consumer population.26 
When the new decade started, serious problems where haunting what was 
already a “loss-making badly managed” firm. This is why in 1980, Francisco Adorna 
Rosales, owner and manager of Inés Rosales, decided to change the legal form of the 
firm and transform it into a public limited company (Inés Rosales SA) with a capital of 
13 million pesetas. He persuaded his nephews, José María and Juan Carlos Bermudo 
Lecumberri, to join the firm and draw a business plan for it.27 They made a diagnosis 
                                                 
22 A small cake with a characteristic cinnamon and anise flavour covered with a fine coating of powdered 
sugar. 
23 With the same texture and ingredients as the traditional torta, but with small bits of sweet almond on 
top. 
24 A double layer of dough flavoured with cinnamon and lemon and filled with cider. 
25 Interview with Juan Moreno, September 17, 2015. 
26 Those were the years of success for doughnuts and other industrial sweetmeats like Tigretón (“Big 
tiger”, a rolled sponge cake filled with apricot jam and cream and covered with chocolate) and Pantera 
Rosa (“Pink panther”, a sponge cake filled with cream and coated with a pink-coloured cover). 
http://www.bimbo.es/productos/merienda/bimbo. 
27 Interview with Juan Moreno, September 17, 2015. Deed of incorporation of Inés Rosales SA. Archive 
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and suggested implementing an Expediente de Regulación de Empleo (ERE, 
employment regulation plan), an option that his uncle totally rejected mentioning the 
family’s honour and commitment to preserve the tradition and protect the employment 
created.28 
Given the impossibility of relaunching Inés Rosales SA without dismissing 
anybody, Francisco Adorna Rosales, who was childless, decided to sell the firm. The 
purchaser was the Sánchez Romero Carvajal group, who appointed a certain Pedro 
Lucas Robles Garrido as the new manager. He implemented the employment regulation 
plan and used the distribution network of Osborne (another company owned by the 
Sánchez Romero Carvajal family holding) to sell Inés Rosales’ tortas.29 The new 
management undertook a series of transformations in the production process (the tortas 
were now mechanically elaborated, saving money but losing authenticity) and the 
packaging process (the tortas were now packed in cardboard boxes, which were cheaper 
but, because they absorb the moisture, made the tortas lose their properties and expire 
earlier). These changes lowered the quality of the product and led to a constant decrease 
in sales, negatively affecting the firm’s profit and loss account. In addition, given that 
the mechanisation process was externally financed –the company’s own resources were 
very limited–, the financing costs increased consequently and led, together with the 
falling revenues, to the firm not being able to face its payment commitments.  
4. A born-again global firm is born: the new Inés Rosales 
A born-again global firm is a company with a prior history and no interest in 
foreign markets that responds to a critical event by undertaking a quick 
                                                                                                                                               
of Inés Rosales. In November 1983, the share capital was increased up to 27 million pesetas. Deed of 
capital increase of Inés Rosales SA. Archive of Inés Rosales. 
28 In Spanish legislation, an ERE is a collective dismissal plan that affects a great number of employees in 
a work centre or company. 
29 In those years, the Sánchez Romero Carvajal holding was increasing and diversifying its activities, 
leaving behind its heavy dependence on pork products, especially ham. 
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internationalisation process of global scope. Inés Rosales outlived two of those critical 
events, rather than just one. The first one took place in 1985 and led to its near 
dissolution due to financial and sales problems. The second one affected the company 
between 1996 and 2004, during the confrontation (see below) that ended with Juan 
Moreno becoming the single owner of the firm. 
From a corporate perspective, Inés Rosales went through a transition phase that 
lasted from 1985, when it was acquired by the new purchasers (Juan Moreno Tocino, 
the brothers José and Antonio Ponce Jiménez, and Juan López), who divided their 
shares into equal lots (25 percent each), to 2004, when the firm became the property of 
the Moreno family.30 The acquisition implied reducing the share capital to zero in order 
to restore the equity balance, destroyed as a result of the company’s accumulated losses, 
and a capital increase of 20 million pesetas in which only the new shareholders 
participated.31 In reality, the disbursement of those 20 million pesetas never took place, 
because the sellers presented a faked accounting record of the firm, given that the actual 
financial discrepancy was larger than the one reflected in the company’s documents.32 
Thus, the new owners used the 20 million to rebalance and reorganise the firm. Of those 
20 million, 15 helped attending the firm’s imminent payments. 
The company’s original share distribution was modified around 1990, because 
only Juan Moreno and Juan López subscribed the capital increase carried out that year. 
Each of them held now 26 percent of the business. Between 1992 and 1993, José and 
                                                 
30 Capital reduction and increase deed of Inés Rosales (November 8, 1985). Archive of Inés Rosales SAU. 
Juan Moreno Tocino used to be a merchant seaman who then became an entrepreneur and worked for 
some time for Inés Rosales’ main competitor, Tortas San Martín de Porres. He now assumed the position 
of Director General at Inés Rosales SA. José and Antonio Ponce Jiménez had previously worked as 
distributors of pastry products and marketers of the tortas produced by Inés Rosales and San Martín de 
Porres. Juan López used to be a baker in the city of Toledo. 
31 Capital reduction and increase deed of Inés Rosales (November 8, 1985). Archive of Inés Rosales SAU. 
The list of machinery available in Inés Rosales SA around 1985 shows that the firm’s inventory valued the 
main installation in 56 million pesetas and the ancillary machinery in 1 million pesetas. List of machinery 
belonging to Francisco Adorna Rosales. Archive of Inés Rosales SAU.  
32 Interview with Juan Moreno, September 17, 2015. 
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Antonio Ponce (who were in disagreement with their two partners) sold their shares for 
90 million pesetas to a company called Arroyo Pérez SL, which thus acquired 48 percent 
of Inés Rosales SA.33 Juan Moreno immediately responded to this operation by 
purchasing Juan López’s 26 percent of the business to guarantee his position as majority 
shareholder.34 These changes took place during a period in which distributors were 
losing their specific weight in the commercialisation of bakery products because large 
sellers were buying directly from the producers. 
The owners of Arroyo Pérez SL, who had mistakenly thought that by purchasing 
those shares they would get hold of most of Inés Rosales’ capital, opposed all 
subsequent shareholders meetings and undertook legal proceedings on the basis of 
disloyal administration.35 Those proceedings ultimately caused the ruin of Arroyo Pérez 
SL when the court ordered the attachment of most of its shares in Inés Rosales, which, 
after being auctioned, ended up in Juan Moreno’s hands.36 Finally, in 2004, the 
company sold the remaining shares to Juan Moreno. He thus became the only 
shareholder of Inés Rosales Sociedad Anónima Unipersonal (SAU), a single-
shareholder firm that nowadays belongs entirely to Corporación Alimentaria SA, a 
corporation whose shareholders and owners are all members of the Moreno Pedrosa 
family (Juan Moreno and his children).37 
                                                 
33 Mentioned on Inés Rosales general shareholders meeting minutes of November 19, 1990. Archive of 
Inés Rosales. 
34 Interview with Juan Moreno, September 17, 2015. Mentioned on Inés Rosales general shareholders 
meeting minutes of June 20, 1991. Archive of Inés Rosales. 
35 Inés Rosales general shareholders meeting minutes of December 13, 1991 and June 25, 1992. Notarized 
request of October 6, 1992 including as an item in the agenda of the next general shareholders meeting “a 
corporate liability action against the company’s administrators”. Archive of Inés Rosales. 
36 Ruling of Seville First Instance Court No. 20 of January 19, 2001: 250 shares for 7,543 pesetas. 
Archive of Inés Rosales. Deed of acquisition of shares seized from Arroyo Pérez SL and auctioned on 
September 6, 2001: 250 shares for 6.8 million pesetas. Archive of Inés Rosales.  
37 300 shares for 3,000 euros on December 31, 2003. Deed of acquisition of shares belonging to Arroyo 
Pérez SL of April 19, 2004. Archive of Inés Rosales. The Spanish Law on Capital Companies defined 
single-shareholder firms as those “in which the total number of shares into which the share capital is 
divided belongs, originally or unexpectedly, to one single shareholder, so that this shareholder is 
considered the owner of all the company’s shares”. Royal Decree 1/2010, approving the final text of the 
Law on Capital Companies. 
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From the point of view of production and marketing, the first decision that the 
company made in 1985 was a massive repurchasing of the stock of Inés Rosales 
products that was still in the hands of the distributors (approximately 70 to 80 percent 
was recovered), using for this operation the remaining 5 million pesetas of the 20 
million provided by the new shareholders.38 The objective was to restore the consumer’s 
trust in the company by removing from the market those products that did not meet the 
quality standards. The second major decision was to return to the old packaging and the 
original production system, since the new owners were sure that the cardboard 
packaging and the mechanised manufacture of olive oil tortas were the two factors that 
affected sales most negatively. 
Costumers immediately perceived the change and, already in June 1985, the 
employees at the factory were working extra hours to meet the increasing demand of 
tortas. Nevertheless, the seasonal character of the production was still an obstacle, 
considering the under-use of the firm’s industrial capacity. The solution was found in 
1986 through a plastic packaging heat-sealing machine, originally designed to preserve 
biscuits, which Inés Rosales adapted to its own needs. The use of this machine allowed 
producing and selling olive oil tortas during the winter, notably increasing the factory’s 
productivity.39 
It was in 1996 when Inés Rosales’ factory moved from its original site in 
Castilleja de la Cuesta to its current and larger premises in the village of Huévar del 
Aljarafe, which allowed expanding and modernising its facilities (incorporating a 
continuous oven and an in-house designed automatic packaging machine). After 2004, 
when the company’s ownership was fully in the hands of the Moreno family, a major 
                                                 
38 Juan Moreno, who drove a truck across Spain with this purpose, personally undertook this repurchase 
operation. Interview with Juan Moreno, September 17, 2015. 




investment process was initiated at the factory (Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1  
Evolution of investment at Inés Rosales SAU  
 
Source: Calculated with data from SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos, Iberian Balance Sheet 
Analysis System) database.  
 
The internationalisation of Inés Rosales was driven by several factors.40 First of 
all, the confirmation that a mature domestic market offered little options for further 
growth. Second, the so-called “democratisation of transport”, i.e. the modernisation and 
streamlining of transport means, which allowed reaching customers wherever they were 
at increasingly reduced prices and without having to ship large quantities of products.41 
Of course, the third and most relevant element was the product itself. In Spain, the olive 
                                                 
40 The ways towards internationalisation taken by Inés Rosales coincide with the ones described in the 
literature. See Madsen, Servais (1997), Knight et al. (2004), Gabrielsson, and Kirpalani (2012).  




















































oil torta is a low-value product commercialised as a low-price, traditional and nostalgic 
product, whereas in foreign markets tortas are a differentiated product that fits healthy 
food consumption patterns, because it is handmade with wheat flour and olive oil and 
has no preservatives, food colourings or additives.42 
The firm prepared itself for the challenge posed by the internationalisation 
process by sending its managers to international fairs and meetings where they could 
gather information about the different countries and market possibilities, which helped 
analyse the perception of the product and contact potential distributors (Cambra and 
Vázquez, 2010). Even though the internationalisation process had in fact started earlier, 
in 1998 the firm formally created an export department, which tried to introduce and 
place olive oil tortas in Spanish imported goods stores, to position the whole range of 
products in relevant gourmet stores, to incorporate the torta as a permanent item in the 
menu of international Spanish restaurants, and to look for “distributors who could 
endorse the product, caring for it and preserving its image before the consumers” 
(Cambra and Vázquez, 2010, p. 70). Because of these efforts, olive oil tortas have 
become, in its new destinations, a product for health-minded middle- and high-income 
customers. 
Companies usually start their internationalisation processes by exporting to 
countries that are close to theirs in both language and culture. Inés Rosales made a 
different choice and selected its targets first among countries in Northern and Central 
Europe (the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark), where it had to face the competition of domestic sweetmeats, and then 
                                                 
42 The firm uses extra-virgin olive oil as a differentiating element, profiting from the expanding 
consumption of olive oil in the world and its association with a healthy diet. Executive summary of the 
company’s global internationalisation strategy, 2015, p. 1. The expansion of the Greek company 
Haitoglou was also encouraged by the new eating habits in Europe and North America, which made it 
easier to sell a natural product like halva (Plakoyiannaki and Deligianni, 2009, p. 45). 
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within the Anglo-Saxon market (United Kingdom, United States and Australia).43 All 
these countries had a double common denominator: i) a healthy food culture, which 
conditions the consumers’ purchase decisions and promotes healthy products for which 
they do not mind paying a higher price, and ii) a high income per capita that allows 
consumers to access those high-priced products.44 The main challenge was introducing 
the product in markets with cultural entry barriers against it. In these cases, new eating 
habits needed to be instilled; in other words, the customers had to be taught how to 
savour an olive oil torta.45 
The export plan designed in 1995 was implemented one year later, when exports 
were made to three European countries, although initially their sales barely accounted 
for 1 percent of the firm’s turnover (Figure 1 and Table 1, Annexe). During this first 
phase, the number of target countries slowly increased up to seven, but the 1 percent of 
the turnover barrier was not clearly overcome while the sales were concentrated in 
European Union countries (Tables 2 and 3, Annexe). The effort of entering markets 
where customers were not used to buying foreign manufactured agri-food products and 
then consolidating the company’s presence in those countries slowed down the search 
for new markets.  
 
 
                                                 
43 “Nuestra percepción de la internacionalización no es la de un mercado donde ‘colocar’ productos, sino 
que es una fuente continua de inspiración, de reto, de nuevas propuestas… es lo que nos está 
dinamizando y dando alas para crecer y hacer de nuestra apuesta algo diferente que ofrecer en cada 
momento”. (“Our perception of internationalisation is not that of a market in which to ‘position’ our 
products, but that of a continuous source of inspiration, challenge, new propositions… This is what is 
pushing us and giving us strength to grow and to transform our effort into something new to offer every 
time.”) Executive summary of the company’s global internationalisation strategy, 2015, p. 4.  
44 In Spain, a 6-tortas package costs 1.50 euros, while in the United States the cost is approximately 6 to 7 
dollars (Inés Rosales website). 
45 Cambra and Vázquez (2010) explain how the firm showed its customers how to eat an olive oil torta. In 
order to facilitate the introduction of tortas in England, the word “biscuit” was added to the product’s 
name and the image of a cup of coffee was included in the package. In the United States, the product is 





FIGURE 2  
Export sales as a percentage of total sales  and number of countries to which 
Inés Rosales SAU exports  
 
Source: Calculated witrh data provided by Inés Rosales SAU.  
 
The first five year-period of the 21st century brought a leap forward in the 
number of countries to which the firm exported (thirteen) and in the percentage of 
export sales (around 9 percent). The destination countries were still within the EU (with 
Germany, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom in the first line) and absorbed 
almost 95 percent of the firm’s exports, but there was already a timid approach to the 
North American market (Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3, Annexe). In 2002-2003, the firm 
experienced a slight upturn, and the number of countries to which exports were made 
increased from nine to thirteen. This success was the consequence of greater experience 
and of the product’s consolidation in several foreign markets. 
The beginning of the second half of the decade (2004-2005) brought a setback in 























firm exported to, but not in absolute numbers. With the exception of 2005, these 
numbers kept growing during the whole period. Year 2006 saw the consolidation of the 
expansion in the North American market with sales multiplying by 10 in the United 
States (Table 3, Annexe). 
From 2006 onwards, exports have constantly increased, both in absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of the firm’s total sales (Figure 3). However, Inés Rosales 
concentrated its foreign market activity in six countries only: Belgium, Germany, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, France and United States, which accounted for 50 
percent of the company’s total exports in 2007 (Table 2, Annexe). It was after 2009 that 
exports reached a double-digit percentage, accounting for 17 percent of the firm’s 
turnover in 2011 (Table 1, Annexe). Sales have more than doubled between 2007 and 
2010, rising from 0.5 to 1.2 million euros. The United States’ vitality as a foreign 
market and the company’s consolidation in North European countries are responsible 
for most of those sales. However, in 2014 sales actually dropped to less than 1 million 
euros because of a decline in the North American market (infra) (Table 2, Annexe). 
 
FIGURE 3  














Source: Calculated with data from SABI database and annual statements of Inés Rosales SAU.  
 
Until 2008, Inés Rosales concentrated its export activity in a small group of 
European countries and the United States. However, from 2009 onwards, the number of 
countries to which the firm exported clearly expanded from 14 that year to 23 in 2011. 
The firm was busy consolidating those markets until 2013, but later spread out to other 
countries in South America, Asia and Oceania, until it reached 26 in 2014 (Table 1, 
Annexe). The available data show how Inés Rosales has worked to consolidate the 
European market’s sales volume at around 200,000 euros. 
Not only did the firm’s strategy focus on incrementing the number of 
destinations for its exports, but it also insisted on the healthy character of its products. 
Obtaining quality and Kosher certifications allowed the company to expand the 
customer base by including both Jewish and Muslim consumers and everyone interested 
in taking care of their eating habits.46  
In its search for new European and North American customers, the firm has 
diversified its products and has adapted its flagship product, the traditional olive oil 
torta, to new experiences.47 Selling in northern European markets had an impact on the 
production of cortadillos, which were traditionally elaborated with lard and have now 
been transformed into a fat-free product.48 The North American market forced the 
replacement, in the traditional olive oil torta, of anise, which is associated to alcohol 
consumption, with cinnamon and orange.49 In addition, the North American demand of 
                                                 
46 Executive summary of the company’s global internationalisation strategy, 2015, p. 5. 
47 Interview with Juan Moreno, May 3, 2016. The firm offered new products, as did the companies 
studied by Knight et al. (2004: 654), who underlined the importance of “product innovation and intensive 
marketing/image management”. 
48 In fact, the production of traditional cortadillos was reduced from 133,000 kg in 2013 to 36,000 kg in 
2015. The old cortadillos were substituted by the new fat-free ones, of which 75,000 kg were now 
produced. Information provided by Inés Rosales SAU. 
49 Nowadays, Inés Rosales SAU produces several types of sweet olive oil tortas: the original olive oil 
torta, the sugar-free original olive oil torta, the Seville orange original olive oil torta, and the cinnamon 
original olive oil torta. These last two varieties were originally created for the United States market and 
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a product that is closer to a salty snack has led to the commercialisation of savoury olive 
oil tortas.50  
Within this international expansion operation, the entry in the United States 
market was certainly the most successful one, and it has been the main source of export 
revenues for Inés Rosales since 2006, accounting for 82 percent of the firm’s export 
sales and 14 percent of its global sales. The choice of the United States, due to the 
resemblance of its consumption patterns to those of the United Kingdom, was also 
influenced by the fact that North American consumers have the habit of exploring 
products that are good for their health.51  
The expansion strategy in the United States included some of the patterns 
described in the literature (Solberg, 2012), first of all, the selection of a network of 
small-scale healthy products distributors. Bonds of trust were then created with them 
and soon Inés Rosales’ products accounted for 50 percent of their turnover.52 In those 
years, sales augmented progressively, from the initial 13,000 euros to exceeding the 
sales in European countries as a whole in 2007 and reaching sales of over 1 million 
euros in 2011 (Table 2, Annexe). 
The problem came when a larger group purchased the original distribution 
network, for which Inés Rosales’ products represented a much smaller share of the 
business. After several consecutive takeovers of one distribution group by another 
always increasingly larger one, Inés Rosales’ products ended up accounting for less than 
                                                                                                                                               
account for 5 percent of the total production of tortas. Information provided by Inés Rosales SAU.  
50 Savoury olive oil tortas are elaborated with either rosemary and thyme or sesame and sea salt. They 
account for 4 percent of the total production. Information provided by Inés Rosales SAU. 
51 “En Estados Unidos se comercializan las 5 variedades de tortas y estamos lanzando 2 productos 
tradicionales… adaptando su packaging y formato al mercado estadounidense” (“In the United States, 
five varieties of tortas are already commercialised and we are now launching two traditional products 
[…] adapting their packaging and their format to the United States market.”). Executive summary of the 
company’s global internationalisation strategy, 2015, p. 2. 
52 Interview with Juan Moreno, May 3, 2016. The importer was Blue Marble Brands, belonging to UNFI, 
a large distributor of natural products in the United States and Canada, so that 55 percent of the 
production was actually distributed by UNFI. Information provided by Inés Rosales SAU. 
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1 percent of the distribution decisions. In 2012, the loss of relevance of Spanish olive oil 
tortas in the perception of the new North American distributor led to a drastic fall in 
sales, which was even sharper in 2014 (Figure 4).  
 
Consequently, in 2015, Inés Rosales SAU decided to create Inés Rosales USA 
(IRUSA, New Jersey) as a subsidiary in the United States. As a result, the Spanish 
parent company could decide and control the distribution strategy and objectives 
without depending on third parties.53 Assuming the commercialisation and distribution 
of its production in the United States through this American subsidiary has transformed 
Inés Rosales into a multinational company. 
IRUSA imports the products from Spain, which arrive in the United States in 
containers, and then sells them to North American distributors (local, regional and 
national) and to specific retailers that have been collaborating with the company ever 
since the times of the old importer. IRUSA works mostly with brokers, who are the 
actual commercial force of the company in the United States. These are commercial 
representation and marketing companies that develop all sales and merchandising 
activities in those states where IRUSA is not physically present. In some cases, they 
also work as intermediaries between the company and the distributors, alongside whom 






                                                 
53 Interview with Juan Moreno, May 3, 2016. 
54 Interview with Juan Moreno, May 3, 2016.  
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FIGURE 4  
Sales of Inés Rosales SAU’s products in the United States (EUR) 
 
Source: Calculated with data provided by Inés Rosales SAU.  
 
Inés Rosales is thus focused on its internationalisation process, not only in 
relation to its profits, but as acknowledged by the Executive summary of the company’s 
global internationalisation strategy: 
“Para el 2016 se espera que las Cifra de Facturación Internacional alcance un 
30% de las ventas, para alcanzar en el 2020 un 80% de facturación 
internacional. Este escenario es justamente antagónico al actual, donde la cifra 
de exportación alcanza un 25% del total facturado”.55 
 
 “We expect that the International Turnover will reach 30 percent of our sales in 
2016 and then 80 percent in 2020. This scenario is exactly the opposite of the 
current one, where exports account for 25 percent of the total turnover.” 
 
5. The internationalisation strategy of Inés Rosales: an analysis of its financial 
ratios  
The next step in this research is to evaluate the results of the company’s 
internationalisation strategy according to the main profitability ratios, comparing the 
real data with those calculated in relation only to production and sales in the domestic 
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market. The calculation was done replacing the value of sales, costs and investment in 
foreign markets with the value that would have been obtained had that percentage of the 
production been sold in the Spanish market (Table 4, Annexe). All the indicators (Figure 
5) evidence the same fact: that the firm’s internationalisation strategy is actually a 
survival strategy, the results of which prove its effectiveness when compared to those 
that would have been obtained had the strategy not been implemented. 
 
FIGURE 5  
Profitability of Inés Rosales SAU with and without export revenues 
 
Source: Table 4, Annexe.  
 
The mature domestic market stimulated the implementation of the company’s 
internationalisation strategy. Until that moment, domestic sales had oscillated between 8 
and 8.5 million euros, but export sales allowed total sales to reach a figure between 8.5 
and 9.5 million euros. 
The low EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) reflect Inés Rosales’ 
production costs, which are high due to certain costly inputs of the production process 
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800,000 euros for sales that are close to 8.5 million euros. The best result obtained for 
the margin, which puts the EBIT in relation to sales, is 9.14 percent (2009), certainly a 
small figure, which means that the company earns 9.14 euros for every 100 euros sold. 
The lack of improvement in the margin over the years (it fluctuates between 4.8 and 
8.15 percent) confirms that only a rise in sales would allow maintaining and increasing 
the company’s earnings. 
If the internationalisation effect is taken out of the equation, it is possible to see 
how the company’s performance declines. The firm’s meagre profits suffer significantly 
when the sales drop; they do not, however, because of the costs. The worse data, with 
losses estimated over 323,000 euros, justify the need to compensate the above-
mentioned cost structure with higher sales. The relation between EBIT and sales, i.e. the 
margin, would be negative had the internationalisation not taken place. The margin 
would fall as low as -4.48 percent, causing a major problem to the firm, given that sales 
would not bring profit but losses and the situation would only be solved by increasing 
the turnover. Without export sales, Inés Rosales’ margin would remain negative, 
although it would improve to around 3.54 percent, a poor figure nevertheless, 
considering that the impact of the financial costs (interests) has not been removed from 
the equation.  
The firm’s turnover, with or without the internationalisation, oscillates between 
100 and 120 percent. In both cases, the values are high and reflect that, despite the 
handmade nature of Inés Rosales’ products –artisanal products usually provide a higher 
margin and a lower turnover–, the low margin obtained from their sale implies the 
company’s need to increase its total sales under all circumstances as a key element in 
the profitability strategy of Inés Rosales. 
In consonance with the turnover, ROA (return on assets) values run parallel to 
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margin values, so that what was said about the margin also applies here. It is possible to 
conclude that, the larger the assets, the higher the cost structure, although higher 
production costs do not always imply higher sales. The analysis presents positive ROA 
values when exports are included and negative values when the export effect is not 
taken into account. 
A negative ROA value has an immediate impact on the ROE (return on equity). 
It is important to remember that the ROE depends on three basic factors, two of which 
are directly related to it, while the third one is inversely related. Thus, the company’s 
ROE increases with higher ROA and leverage values and decreases when the cost of 
debt rises. In this specific case, ROE values are very positive when the 
internationalisation effect is included, reaching 26 percent the first year, falling to a 
minimum of 6.92 percent in 2012, and later improving up to 15 percent in 2014. 
When the internationalisation effect is dismissed, the scenario is radically 
different, because ROE values would turn negative in the period between 2010 and 
2013 because of the firm’s losses, which, unless capital increases were approved, would 
inevitably undermine the firm’s shareholders’ equity. Without the support of the foreign 
markets, the ROE drops from -10.59 percent to -18 percent and the accumulation of 
losses makes the firm’s equity shrink to half its value, thus compromising the 
company’s future viability. From a legal point of view, it would certainly constitute 
grounds for dissolution. 
The firm’s total assets, which have an impact on the profitability ratios, 
increased during the first four years until, in 2013, they declined following a 
concentration process that allowed the firm to reduce its assets and to slim down the 
financial structure in the form of debts, thus lessening the financial costs and the risk of 
insolvency (Table 4, Annexe). The results of the internationalisation strategy were not 
27 
 
directly affected by this, but they were indeed indirectly influenced, considering that the 
slimming down of the economic structure and, as a result, of the financial structure, 
became a competitive advantage in the access to external resources to be used for new 
investments.  
6. Conclusions 
The literature explains that born-again global firms do not have to be necessarily 
young, as born-global firms are. In fact, they usually are high-tech companies with a 
long history focused on the domestic market that, after a critical incident, re-emerge as 
rapidly internationalised companies capable of selling, within an average five-year 
period, up to 25 percent of their production in foreign markets.  
Inés Rosales SAU is a born-again global firm that, after 75 years of history in the 
Spanish market, overcame the critical events that led to its near demise, as well as the 
later confrontations between the new investors, and is finally driven since the Moreno 
family took over as majority shareholder in 1996 and single owner in 2004. Inés 
Rosales, considering the absence of growth of the national market, undertook the 
company’s internationalisation. It was, therefore, the owners will and commitment to 
implement this new strategy. The role played by Juan Moreno in the internationalisation 
process is close to an “international entrepreneurship”, defined as “the process of 
creatively discovering and exploiting opportunities that lie outside a firm’s domestic 
markets in the pursuit of competitive advantage” (Zahra and George, 2002, p. 61). This 
process is intimately associated with born-global and born-again global firms and 
represents a new and necessary evidence, considering that the contribution of business 
history to the field of “international entrepreneurship” is limited (Gil López et al., 
2016).  
The time sequence of this born-again global firm’s development shows that its 
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internationalisation began in 1996 and was reinforced in 2004. The scale of the process 
increased progressively, so that the volume of total sales in foreign markets leaped from 
5 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2011. The scope of the process also increased with 
time, in such a way that the 3 countries to which the company exported in 1996 became 
9, five years later, and expanded to 25 in 2014. In 2015, the internationalisation process 
entered a new phase with the establishment of IRUSA in the United States, transforming 
Inés Rosales into a multinational firm. The internationalisation of Inés Rosales has been 
parallel and, at the same time, fed back by, on the one hand, the diversification of its 
products that has helped opening new markets, and, on the other, the modernisation of 
the production process, with the use of a continuous oven and an in-house designed 
packaging machine. 
The economic-financial results of Inés Rosales conclude that the 
internationalisation strategy allowed solving the problem that a very mature domestic 
market represented (in 1985 dissolving the firm was thought to be the only way out) by 
taking advantage of the benefits of scale and scope. Inés Rosales’ financial ratios are 
positive due to the internationalisation, and they seem more positive when compared to 
the results that would have been obtained in case this strategy had not been applied. 
High production costs associated to the quality of Inés Rosales’ products demand that 
the firm increases its export sales in order to maximise earnings and achieve margins 
that are more plausible. The financial ratios are in line with the success of the 
company’s internationalisation strategy. 
The case of Inés Rosales widens the field of what is understood as a born-again 
global firm in the direction of integrating companies that belong to traditional sectors 
and sell traditional products. One of the most remarkable aspects is that this firm’s 
flagship product, rather than being technology-based, as the literature on born-again 
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global businesses affirms it should be, has been manufactured with very basic raw 
materials for over a hundred years. Moreover, in the production process of olive oil 
tortas both manual and mechanised techniques are used, which is another differentiating 
element. Despite the diversification of Inés Rosales’ products, implemented with the 
purpose of responding to the particularities of the international demand, the traditional 
olive oil torta is still the firm’s cornerstone.  
In summary, cases as that of Inés Rosales SAU prove how a small company with 
a limited market is not synonymous with technological backwardness or a predictable 
failure trajectory, and show the capacity of family small and medium-sized businesses 
to adapt themselves to changes and to internationalise even in markets that are culturally 
distant from their own. 
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TABLE 1  












Average Exp. / 
Country (EUR) 
1996 10,996 2,600,494 3 0.42 99.58 3,665 
1997 15,234 2,189,739 6 0.70 99.30 2,539 
1998 23,367 2,188,761 7 1.07 98.93 3,338 
1999 25,100 2,248,376 6 1.12 98.88 4,183 
2000 122,100 2,957,847 7 4.13 95.87 17,443 
2001 138,300 2,565,384 8 5.39 94.61 17,288 
2002 199,100 2,493,402 9 7.99 92.01 22,122 
2003 258,900 2,683,342 10 9.65 90.35 25,890 
2004 203,200 2,946,756 13 6.90 93.10 15,631 
2005 191,000 2,711,344 10 7.04 92.96 19,100 
2006 336,743 5,368,599 9 6.27 93.73 37,416 
2007 508,000 5,792,497 6 8.77 91.23 84,667 
2008 526,500 6,745,390 6 7.81 92.19 87,750 
2009 907,110 8,484,274 14 10.69 89.31 64,794 
2010 1,262,715 9,239,410 20 13.67 86.33 63,136 
2011 1,648,531 9,458,558 23 17.43 82.57 71,675 
2012 1,575,209 9,254,120 23 17.02 82.98 68,487 
2013 1,501,449 9,411,135 23 15.95 84.05 65,280 




Source: Calculated with data provided by Inés Rosales SAU.  
 
TABLE 2  
Distribution of sales by region. Inés Rosales SAU (EUR) 
Country/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
European Union 10,966 15,234 23,367 25,100 122,100 138,300 199,100 245,900 209,700 172,000 215,300 184,000 146,500 179,411 259,366 176,406 215,219 229,369 206,166 
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,000 36,000 18,000 118,443 324,000 380,000 652,897 903,217 1,353,848 1,226,078 1,160,323 570,823 
Rest of the world 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 1,000 3,000 0 0 74,803 100,132 118,278 133,911 110,753 108,612 
 
Source: Caulcated with data provided by Inés Rosales SAU.  
 
TABLE 3  
Distribution of sales by country. Inés Rosales SAU (thousands of EUR)  
Country/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Belgium 4.67 4.30 3.70 0.00 76.00 62.00 65.00 95.00 83.00 52.00 68.00 69.00 35.00 0.00 0.00 1.35 1.00 1.40 5.87 
Germany  2.50 3.20 6.70 5.00 7.00 14.00 10.00 27.50 30.00 34.00 60.00 62.00 53.00 32.00 41.69 37.04 39.86 80.41 56.52 
Andorra 3.80 3.60 4.60 3.90 3.70 4.00 2.20 7.00 9.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.01 0.91 0.00 1.80 0.00 
Switzerland 0.00 1.13 1.70 0.60 2.70 6.00 6.00 4.40 6.00 8.00 13.00 18.00 20.00 11.59 9.86 23.80 18.42 13.13 10.85 
United Kingdom  0.00 0.70 0.80 0.60 0.80 14.00 13.00 16.00 11.00 8.00 47.00 12.00 2.50 46.31 99.63 18.67 67.26 33.92 27.88 
France 0.00 2.30 5.20 14.00 31.00 28.00 35.00 39.00 43.00 59.00 26.00 23.00 36.00 63.10 61.97 56.42 70.71 69.06 68.71 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 8.00 64.00 52.00 20.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.37 1.60 2.84 2.57 4.74 16.37 
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The Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.90 2.30 1.70 1.50 3.00 2.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 17.02 23.10 3.08 1.15 0.58 2.86 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 3.50 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.10 4.39 3.73 3.50 3.63 0.00 
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.00 36.00 18.00 118.44 324.00 380.00 652.90 903.22 1,353.85 1,226.08 1,160.32 570.82 
Malta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.00 1.07 
Algeria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.19 5.45 7.54 21.33 21.57 9.90 
Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 56.03 32.37 33.08 26.52 22.01 22.76 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.22 4.31 13.85 2.34 0.80 0.00 
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 5.92 3.47 4.03 1.31 14.32 
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.14 13.04 10.97 8.11 8.40 6.73 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.45 8.01 3.28 0.00 1.27 0.38 
Guatemala 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.06 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 52.17 53.34 50.75 47.99 
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.32 2.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No allocation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.10 8.92 5.84 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dominican Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.27 5.96 0.00 0.74 
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.88 3.36 11.54 3.96 
Arab Emirates 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.14 3.80 6.17 
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.64 2.92 6.10 
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.38 0.00 0.00 
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 2.99 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.55 5.99 2.61 
Romania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 
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Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.21 
Peru 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 
Total 10.97 15.23 23.37 25.10 122.10 138.30 199.10 258.90 246.20 191.00 336.74 508.00 526.50 907.11 1,262.72 1,648.53 1,575.21 1,500.44 891.70 
 
Source: Calculated with data provided by Inés Rosales SAU. 
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TABLE 4  
Comparative analysis of the profitability of Inés Rosales SAU  with and 
without exports  
Profitability 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total assets56 7,227,360 7,729,479 9,347,892 9,177,513 7,901,612 8,511,887 
Interests 124,814 113,818 186,288 227,330 176,693 138,056 
Total debt 4,803,650 5,102,912 6,488,726 6,113,841 4,461,882 4,526,164 
Shareholders’ equity57 2,423,710 2,626,567 2,859,166 3,063,672 3,439,730 3,985,723 
Cost of debt 2.60% 2.23% 2.87% 3.72% 3.96% 3.05% 
Profitability with exports 
Sales 8,484,274 9,239,410 9,458,558 9,254,120 9,411,135 8,920,941 
EBIT58 775,256 447,454 561,877 439,399 617,963 757,760 
EBT59 650,442 333,636 375,589 212,069 441,270 619,704 
ROA60 10.73% 5.79% 6.01% 4.79% 7.82% 8.90% 
Margin61 9.14% 4.84% 5.94% 4.75% 6.57% 8.49% 
Turnover62 117.39% 119.53% 101.18% 100.83% 119.10% 104.81% 
ROE63 26.84% 12.70% 13.14% 6.92% 12.83% 15.55% 
Financial leverage 198.19% 194.28% 226.94% 199.56% 129.72% 113.56% 
Profitability without exports 
Sales 8,049,617 8,634,359 8,668,637 8,499,332 8,691,691 8,491,606 
EBIT 327,000 -165,207 -230,601 -323,881 -115,769 300,412 
EBT 202,186 -279,025 -416,889 -551,211 -292,462 162,356 
ROA 4.54% -2.29% -3.21% -4.48% -1.60% 4.17% 
Margin 4.06% -1.91% -2.66% -3.81% -1.33% 3.54% 
Turnover 111.65% 119.84% 120.60% 117.68% 120.35% 117.95% 
ROE  8.34% -10.62% -14.58% -17.99% -8.50% 4.07% 
Financial leverage 198.19% 194.28% 226.94% 199.56% 129.72% 113.56% 
  
Source: Calculated with data provided by Inés Rosales SAU and SABI database 
                                                 
56 The Total Assets are the amount of resources that the company uses for the development of its activity. 
57 The Shareholders’ Equity represents the surplus (or lack) of the company’s assets as compared to its 
liabilities. It includes the shareholders’ original investment, the earnings that have been retained for internal 
expansion and the current year’s profits or losses.  
58 The Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) eliminates interest and direct taxes, which have no actual 
effect on the firm’s economic activity.  
59 Earnings before Taxes. 
60 The Return on Assets is the result of dividing the EBIT by the Total Assets. It represents the return of the 
company’s activity per euro invested. 
61 The Margin shows the relation between EBIT and Sales. It represents the return of the company’s activity 
per euro of sales.  
62 The Turnover is calculated by dividing the Sales by the Total Assets and has a special impact on firms with 
narrow margins, because of its leverage effect on the margin. 
63 The Return on Equity is calculated by dividing the EBT by the Shareholders’ Equity. 
